Opening the Doors of Invention: Institutions, Technology and Developing Nations by Root, Hilton L.
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 7  ·  Issue 1  ·  2006  ·  © International Public Management Network 
14 
 
OPENING THE DOORS OF INVENTION: INSTITUTIONS, 
TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPING NATIONS 
Hilton L. Root 
 
ABSTRACT 
What can the knowledge economy offer developing countries? Can developing nations 
hope to transform existing social and economic relations into an information society? 
What are the roles of trust, social forces, laws, internal governance structures, financial 
and information intermediaries, regulators and civil society? Does the creation of an 
information society represent a paradigm shift in development that requires different 
thinking and a different path from that taken by agrarian societies that have 
industrialized?  This article explores these questions, investigating the path that 
developing nations can follow to build a knowledge-based service economy.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The gap between the haves and have-nots is widening both between nations and within 
nations.1  This divergence is due to the ability of certain countries to harness technology 
and scientific knowledge to build commercially viable products.2  However, developing 
countries are finding that the social organizations necessary to engender trust, transmit 
information, and establish norms of reciprocity present a larger hurdle than mastering 
the engineering component of the new knowledge based technologies. 
Even after acquiring the technical know-how of wealthier nations, many developing 
nations find it difficult to establish institutions to transform knowledge into useful 
products.3  They quickly discover that the institutions necessary to generate knowledge 
are different than the ones required for creating products demanded by the market.   To 
remove the ceiling on growth, poorer nations must design institutions that bring together 
technology and market. 
An exploration of the institutions that emerged in the United States, namely in Silicon 
Valley, offer illustrations that breach the gulf between technical innovation and market 
demand.   Silicon Valley may no longer be the beacon of high tech prowess as it was in 
the 1990’s, but it offers many examples of the link between social institutions that foster 
trust and technological progress.    
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LESSONS FOR THE NEXT TECHNOLOGICAL POWERHOUSE 
With its abundance of cheap engineers, its many venues for group research spending 
and abundant onsite foreign intellectual property, China is groping to build a solid 
foundation for its high tech sectors.4 Technology parks have sprung up throughout 
China.  Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hefei are among the 60 Chinese municipalities 
that have spent impressive amounts of money to build state-of-the art facilities.  These 
provincial efforts to be the next Silicon Valley include attractive benefit packages and 
on site recreational and housing facilities. For China, Silicon Valley’s misfortunes are 
an opportunity to lure back Chinese ex-patriot engineers whose ambitions are thwarted 
in the U.S.  The central Government is offering handsome financial incentive packages 
to lure Chinese engineers home from overseas to the new centers.5  Yet, a high 
concentration of successful high tech companies still eludes China. Is it enough to build 
the right structures, employ people with the right credentials, and then hope the rest will 
follow?6   
The entrepreneurial roots of China’s high tech sector are shallow. The value of most 
high tech goods produced in China comes from foreign companies.7 China’s track 
record at sustaining high tech companies is poor.  One reason China is slow at climbing 
the high technology ladder is that start-up companies cannot find capital.  Duplicating 
technology seems easier than creating necessary financial institutions. China’s 
difficulties at creating self-sustaining technology clusters to become a transmission belt 
of knowledge in the global economy mirror those of other developing country hopefuls.    
 
ANATOMY OF A KNOWLEDGE DRIVEN COMMUNITY 
The vertically integrated corporation is responsible for much of the great increase in the 
standard of living of Americans during the twentieth century. It typically controls a 
large set of unique assets through a command and control hierarchy. This way it 
internalizes many of the risks of transacting across markets, allowing it to capture the 
benefits of scale economies and to establish market control. Yet, between 1975 and 
1990 Silicon Valley generated some 150,000 new technology jobs by challenging the 
organizational legacy of the vertically integrated firm. 8 By 1990 it exported more than 
$11 billion in electronics, more than one third the U.S. totals, creating a post-industrial 
production format that is the prototype for the information age.  
Silicon Valley is comprised of diffuse production networks, surmounting the boundaries 
of individual firms, and spanning the entire industry. This openness promotes learning 
and knowledge sharing among specialist workers of complex, related technologies.    
Companies compete intensely while learning from each other. Staff moves about 
relentlessly. Firms exchange managers, owners, and creditors just as easily as they 
exchange labor and parts, allowing competitors to be highly informed about the 
activities of rival firms.  How unlike the traditional corporate model in which workers 
passively accept goals set by a central management!   
The traditional corporate structure failed to develop new products fast enough to 
compete with the Silicon Valley model. This is why Silicon Valley eventually surpassed 
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the technology corridor of Route 128 in Massachusetts where production activities were 
internalized among large well-capitalized firms, fattened on government contracts, 
operating according to the traditional model of autarky, secrecy, loyalty and stability; 
the traditional corporate hierarchy ensured centralized information flows and control by 
a few senior corporate executives. Route 128’s large firms internalized most skills and 
technology and tightly police boundaries between firms and local institutions to prevent 
ideas from leaking out.  Secrecy and loyalty to hierarchy are a cardinal virtue; the only 
networks that matter are internal, those who leave are deserters: collaborating with the 
outside is suspect, learning and exchanging with others is treason. The formidable 
hierarchies of the past were self-contained, stand-alone systems, not suited to 
production that depends significantly on information access. Competitiveness in 
technology requires shortening information pathways so that the right information gets 
to the right person at the right time. Vertically integrated firms have the disadvantage 
that in inter-company transactions, the performance and contribution of the each 
constituent component of the enterprise is difficult to assess.   This model was not 
organized for continuous innovation in an industry that required it. Its formal decision-
making procedures lacked flexibility and responsiveness to fast changing markets. 
Information technology project completion can be faster in a small start up company 
than in a large established firm in which the idea originated.9 To compete with the start-
ups established Silicon Valley producers decentralized their operations, creating inter 
and intra-firm production networks to capitalize on the regions social and technical 
integration.  Although not a Valley firm, the breakdown of the mammoth IBM into 
decentralized profit centers is an example of the forces of decentralization at work 
within the industry.10  
The importance of open industry architecture is captured in the often-repeated phrase, 
“The story in Silicon Valley is that people work for the Valley: they do not work for the 
firm”.11 High value-added activities require high quality information that must easily 
jump over the walls of corporation, ethnicity, clan, class, race and nation.    
 
THE STRENGHTH OF WEAK TIES 
Silicon Valley’s experience provides a strong case for the counter-intuitive idea that 
weak social ties enable strong market forces.    Weak ties allow new ideas to enter into 
the network and are more likely to encourage innovative thinking than are tightly knit 
communities. This is why Richard Florida finds that the density of gay couples and 
artists closely correlates with the density of patent requests.12 He observes creative 
people with low social capital flocking to cities where they fit in quickly and find others 
to engage their ideas. Comparing social capital with levels of innovation by the number 
of patents filled he finds that areas with high levels of social capital tend to be low on 
innovation.  Seattle, Washington, Boulder, Colorado, San Francisco, California, and 
college towns in general, all with low levels of social capital, are more innovative than 
cities with strong ethnic enclaves, single industry towns or those with stable population 
bases.13 The poorest people in the world even when their communities enjoy high social 
capital have limited access to new ideas, trapped by primordial loyalties, they are often 
more concerned with correcting the past than creating the future. 
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Silicon Valley capitalized on weak social ties to both stimulate and finance new ideas. 
In contrast to many successful developing country economies that depends upon strong 
social ties to encourage relationship-based investment.  Weak social ties can actually 
inspire innovation by providing novel connections and diverse perspectives. Unrelated 
industries or remote analytical disciplines are where the danger to established certainties 
may be lurking.   The Valley’s great innovators came from all over the world and 
represented a range of intellectual disciplines as wide ranging as anthropology, literary 
criticism and nuclear physics.  They shared few prior ties and rarely had links to 
inherited wealth or government connections.  To learn how to cooperate, they defied the 
limits of finance, social organization, religion, ethnic rivalry, and nationalism.  
Strong social ties among members of a team can suppress innovation, stifle creativity 
and memorialize existing certainties. Highly cohesive groups tend to maintain existing 
local hierarchies and seek concurrence discouraging the frank exchange of views.  
Strong communal ties can insulate members from outside information and challenges 
while promoting conformity. 
 
NO SPECIAL TREATMENT FROM GOVERNMENT 
In developing countries, businesses typically enjoy close ties with government.  Ideally, 
this should help steer private investment into socially productive channels.  
Unfortunately, government officials often take private interest in the projects they 
oversee.  For example, licensing loopholes allow officials to use administrative 
discretion to gain shares in productive activities under their jurisdiction, forcing would-
be entrepreneurs to spend time and money courting government officials.  Cross-
country studies of competitiveness bluntly assess the time and maneuvering it takes to 
register a legitimate business and to obtain the permits necessary to stay in business.14In 
Silicon Valley very little time is spent pursuing licenses, subsides and permits. 
Historically, the Valley’s companies did not take advantage of licenses or legal 
opportunities; in fact, many company leaders were foreign born and had no political ties 
to Washington. They were not political entrepreneurs like business leaders in 
developing countries, such as Thailand's president Thaksin Shinawatra. They were 
market entrepreneurs seeking ways to produce cheaper, better goods and services.  They 
had virtually no political representation and did not engage in collective action for the 
enforcement or reduction of competition.  Government never directly involved itself in 
company decisions, and Silicon Valley was never a preferred region.   Silicon Valley 
firms were never picked as winners and did not enjoy the status of national champions 
backed by government largess.   
From the perspective of finance, Silicon Valley represents an anomaly, an exception to 
all the tried-and-true lessons in finance.  In banker parlance, the Valley’s enterprises 
lack collateral in the form of fixed assets, bricks and mortar, plants and equipment, and, 
as a result, are un-bankable. Moreover, deep social allegiances do not exist from which 
to raise funds from established social networks.  Valley firms are generally a stranger to 
government patronage, and do not employ vertical integration as a means to overcome 
market uncertainties.  How is this novel system of industrial relations funded?   
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INVESTMENT FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL GROWTH 
Efforts by the government of South Korea to create a homegrown Silicon Valley are 
instructive of the obstacles other developing societies face.  South Korea has brainy 
young kids, well trained in engineering, willing to risk everything to start their own 
companies, and the country has institutional investors with abundant funds. Throwing 
money at ideas is not enough; creating viable companies that manufacture and market a 
finished commercially viable product requires a wide range of intermediary skills. The 
missing middle stage of enterprise promotion is frequently filled in the US by venture 
capitalists.15  
Venture capitalists are financial intermediaries who manage funds contributed by other 
financiers, especially those of institutional investors, who know very little about the 
industry in which their funds are operating. Many of these investors have never visited 
the Valley and would not know a hard drive from a CD-ROM. The venture capitalists 
possess knowledge about how to create a company or to commercialize a product that 
neither the investors nor the innovators possess.  They pick opportunities for growth, 
having broad experience in company and product development, finding suppliers, 
writing contracts with distributors, dealing with lawyers, marketers and ensuring that a 
market exists when the product is ready for production. Thus venture capital is value-
added investment.  Advocates of the venture capital industry like to point out that it 
costs more to train a venture capitalist than a jet fighter pilot, except that VCs learn 
most from their ventures that crash.  
Since 1987 venture funding grew from small boutique operations to major industry 
status investing $103 billion in 2000, more than all the foreign direct investment into 
China in any given year to date.16  Two essential roles explain why this industry grew so 
rapidly.  
American venture capitalists find the dominant cause of venture failure to be founder 
egotism that leads to poor senior management.17 The start-up firm’s founder will 
typically use the firm’s resources to enhance his or her personal well-being rather than 
to maximize return on investment.  Founders are known to like four of the five essential 
`P’s’, perks, power, prestige and pay but not the essential P, performance.  Egotism 
often has free reign in start up technology firms because the founder has obtained 
funding for which the capital contributor has no recourse. There are no assets to 
repossess if the founder fails to perform.   
At the outset, when the firm’s ownership structure is still amorphous, the founders are 
likely to dominate all the firm’s relationships with the outside.  Although personalized 
authority may make the small firm work well, it creates barriers to future growth.  When 
the founder has too much power, outside financing is harder to obtain.   Countervailing 
against `founder egotism’, venture capitalists seek to impose a governance structure on 
the firm to prevent the founder from employing the firm’s financial resources 
idiosyncratically, or for private gain, via asset stripping or transfer pricing.18 Future 
investors look for governance structures to ensure that the firm manager is constrained 
by rules to act in the interests of investors.   To protect their initial investments, venture 
capitalists like to ensure the professional management of the firm to make future 
financing easier and to facilitate the eventual sale of the firm.  
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The expectation of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) is critical to attracting the entry of 
venture capitalists; IPOs represent an effective and often lucrative prospect for exit.19 
But a company will be more difficult to dispose of if potential investors fear an 
entrenched tyrant, undisciplined by a governance structure that ensures accountability to 
shareholders. This is why professional venture capitalists generally seek to strengthen 
the management team as a condition of their investment. To be sure that the five P’s are 
in place, starting with performance in terms of returns on capital, they typically take a 
seat on the company board.20 
Venture capitalists also play a critical role in preventing the wasteful selection of 
projects.  Each industry success creates more investment capital for future ventures but 
costly mistakes are a burden the entire industry must bear.  To reduce waste, venture 
capitalists have developed an expertise in selecting projects by tournament. Before a 
project is completed, projects are funded in installments, and funding requests are 
subjected to repeated tournaments that test progress and product viability.21 
Venture backed firms compete for each infusion of capital by convincing their backers 
that they will develop new products that markets want. Thus, expensive mistakes are 
avoided; potential white elephants are caught before becoming a heavy burden on the 
entire industry and soak up funds that might have otherwise sponsored more 
commercially viable activities. Government-sponsored projects, by contrast, typically 
have powerful political sponsors, who will fight to preserve financially non-viable 
projects until they become expensive white elephants.  If government acts to stop an 
ongoing project, vociferous coalitions are likely to stop them.  By contrast, Silicon 
Valley producers must live with the continuous but uncomfortable threat of project 
termination, because, with their own money on the line, venture capitalists cannot afford 
to borrow more money to paper over previous mistakes.  
In these two capacities, firm governance and tournament management, the venture 
capitalist seeks a management and product structure that will be sensitive to market 
signals, ensuring a high correlation between value-added and investment. There is little 
role for venture capital when political access is the key to enterprise success.     
 
THE DEBT TO SOCIETY SILICON VALLEY WILL NEVER REPAY 
Talented, highly trained engineers are not unique to Silicon Valley; many live in Russia, 
in Asia and in other parts of the world. They may be by their training and disposition 
natural risk takers, but not to worry, generally they have no money to risk.  Someone 
else has to put up the funding because a rich aunt or distant relation may not be 
available. In technology, that someone is usually unknown to innovators because having 
started a project they quickly exhaust friends and personal contacts.  Typically, they are 
no longer sure about being invited to Christmas dinner by the time they turn to external 
sources for support.   
Having come to the end of personal resources does not mean a project has come to the 
end of the line.  The innovator can take advantage of a well-established commercial 
infrastructure that offers many prospects of finding outside investment.   
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The refinement of the investment process occurred because institutions exist that 
transfer risk to those most capable of managing it. A wide diversity of capital 
instruments enables people to take chances on new ideas and to match money with 
talent.  The capital market options that exist for entrepreneurs to borrow against future 
earnings include junk bonds (high yield, high-risk debt instruments), not as important 
for technology start-ups as for operations that have a steady cash flow (hotels, giant 
department stores and phone providers). Securities (ownership of equity in the 
corporation), by contrast, are particularly important for tech start-ups because of the 
intense cyclicality of the industry.  Angels (professional investors using their own 
money to make early stage investments), venture capital (investors of their own and 
other people’s money; their high risk, high reward portfolio is a small part of the larger 
portfolio held by other, usually institutional investors), initial public offerings (first time 
shares sold publicly), and leveraged buy-outs (using existing assets and cash flow as 
collateral to obtain funds to buy out a portion or all of the existing management).22 The 
decentralization of capital instruments allows risk to be matched with opportunity to 
those most willing and most able to carry it.  Companies can choose the kind of 
financing most suited to market structure. If not for the diversity of instruments 
available investors, the U.S. standard of living would be very different from what it is 
today, and much talent would have been wasted. 
The government, implicitly backed by taxpayers, is not exposed to risks that are best 
managed by those closer to the market. The risks are assumed by the investors who 
stand most to gain and are in the best position to manage those risks. Capital markets 
enable perfect strangers, fund providers, to give their lifetime savings over to other 
perfect strangers, fund users, often through an intermediary they have never met.  Fund 
users then create companies with the savings of individuals who know virtually nothing 
about the industry in which they are investing. This event would be remarkable if it 
happened occasionally but it is reenacted, not thousands of times, but millions of times 
in a single day of trading on the NASDAQ, creating billions of dollars of value. New 
industries provided with the resources to wire the entire planet and launch satellites into 
space have resulted, allowing every human being to communicate at low cost directly 
with any other. Even if the firms that undertake this investment do not prosper, society 
gains from the expansion of industrial capacity that otherwise would not exist.  
ON BEING BORN LUCKY 
Why are capital markets essential for technological progress?  Compare the diversified 
capital markets in Silicon Valley to the options would-be entrepreneurs face in 
developing countries.  One option is to seek funding from thousands of independent 
individuals, going door-to-door, person-to-person, in the hope of collecting a nickel 
here and a dime there.  This scenario is highly improbable, we rarely hear of businesses 
being started by people knocking on the doors of their neighbors.  Alternatively, an 
entrepreneur can turn to existing financial intermediaries but here the choices are 
similarly dismal. Financial institutions in developing countries are owned by the 
government or by someone with close ties to the government. If the state does not own 
the banking system outright, market entry is restricted and the right to acquire or 
establish a financial institution only granted to certain groups with political or family 
connections.  Such institutions are unlikely to take risk because they do not face 
competition for the savings they disperse. 23 
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Financial institutions in developing economies are careful to lend to individuals or 
enterprises to which they share prior direct or indirect connections. Many loans are 
transacted through an intermediary who is a friend or family member of the borrower 
because, without recourse to impartial law enforcement, the promise of repayment relies 
greatly upon trust.24 By lending to familiar faces, the banking system, immersed in 
informality, compensates for the informational deficiencies of the faceless market.   
However, the resulting financial concentration immobilizes capital and prevents risk 
from being absorbed by those most capable of doing so.   
Dependence upon banks as the sole source of capital is by itself a considerable obstacle 
to development.  To bankers, ideas are as ephemeral as dreams. Since they require 
tangible collateral, real estate or cash flow, to service obligations, bankers find high-
tech start-ups unattractive.  A techie is likely to have only ideas to offer and may not 
have rich relatives to substitute for missing capital markets. 
When sources of capital are limited, the funding for new technology will be limited to 
the needs of already established social interests.   This is why social spending in Latin 
America on information technology and education has been disappointing. Elites that 
derive their wealth from resource extraction are insensitive to the possibilities of 
creating new employment in other sectors. 
Knowledge-intensive production constitutes a paradigm shift in development; it is 
different than traditional industrial production or resource extraction. Unlike a natural 
resource, accessible to anyone lucky enough to acquire information privately through 
discreet channels or to use visible government infrastructure for extraction, technology 
opportunities come from the inventiveness of a single human brain.  No secret treasure 
map exists to the source of this wealth. Political access or institutional muscle cannot 
force someone to have an idea.   An army is not needed to ensure that products are 
smuggled across borders to paying customers.  The difference between wealth creation 
in the industrial age and in the information age can be illustrated by the following story 
of George Bush Senior’s initiation in the Texas oil fields.  
Being born lucky, George Bush Sr. came to Texas in pursuit of something tangible in 
the ground that is depleted by use and one party’s use is at the expense of another’s. The 
oil I burn in my vehicle is not available for use in yours, which makes measurement 
easy.  Value creation in traditional industries differs from knowledge age formats such 
as the internet because the more you use my internet network, the more value you create 
for me, making measurement of the value added difficult.25 
Let’s get back to Texas in the 1950s.   To get the oil out of the ground, George Bush Sr., 
like many of his counterparts, depended upon a comparative advantage that serviced 
yesterday’s production handsomely – a number of wealthy personal relationships.  
Having rich relatives in Greenwich, Connecticut, whose ancestors were fortunate to be 
on one of the first ships carrying immigrants to North America was useful.  
It was about $300,000 when they added it all together.26 
Finally, one night, Bush said: “Geez, if I could raise some money, do you think we 
could do that? Maybe get in business?” Overby considered the proposition for about 
thirty seconds before he said, Yeah, he figured they could. 
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In the short run, money was equal to or better than know-how.  And money—to be 
precise, OPM, Other People’s Money—was the calling card of the best young Yalie 
independents.  Earle Craig was playing with Pittsburgh money.  So were Ashmun and 
Hilliard.  (H.T. “Toby” Hilliard was actually Harry Talbot Hilliard, of the Talbots of 
Fox Chapel, where the Mellons and friends had their houses,) Hugh and Bill Liedtke 
were keyed into oil money from Tulsa.  Without outside money, you could spend a long 
while hustling leases before you could call any oil your own.  So Overbey would be 
happy to show Bush everyone he knew… Bush happily flew back east to talk to Uncle 
Herbie.  And Herbie Walker was delighted to place a bet on his favorite, Poppy, and to 
tell his Wall Street friends all about the doings of Pres Bush’s boy.  Pres himself went in 
for fifty thousand, along with Herbie, and some of Herbie’s London clients, who all got 
bonds for their investment, along with shares in the new company—Bush-Overbey, they 
called it.  Herbie Walker had decreed the name.  After all, it was his money. 
In most of the developing world, relationship-laden finance – similar to what 
underwrote the Texas venture of the young George Bush Sr. - is the only kind available.  
However, the future will be one of creating wealth through ideas.  Cozy contacts that 
could build oil wells in Texas are yesterday’s solutions because such contacts of a 
single individual, no matter how well connected, cannot adequately match tomorrow’s 
opportunities with today’s capital.   Silicon Valley has depended mostly on private 
individuals that invest their own wealth in start-ups of entrepreneurs unrelated to them 
through family or prior friendships.  
The great wealth of the future is not in the ground; it is in the heads and on the drawing 
boards of well-trained scientists seeking to escape the slums of Delhi, Manila and 
Philadelphia. Of course education is essential if these prospects are to see the light of 
day.  Building schools and hiring teachers is the easy part; these exist in some of the 
most repressive cultures and regions in the world.  But people must also be provided a 
sense of self-efficacy gained from having future disposal over what they create.  
Transforming abstract ideas into products that people value represents the most 
important path by which poverty will be conquered in the twenty-first century. 
Knowledge based production is not only for rich countries, consider the enormous risks 
that must be surmounted before ordinary working people in the world’s poorest nations 
will buy future shares in productive enterprises, not managed or owned by family 
relations.  
To appreciate the value of social and institutional assets to development, consider the 
contrast between a young, untested, penniless innovator who has just graduated with an 
advanced degree in engineering from an American University and an equally 
entrepreneurial soul in the Middle East who similarly dreams of starting a business of 
his own.  Upon opening a stall in the local bazaar, this unlucky individual must fight off 
tax -collectors and government officials to protect any surplus wealth that can be 
confiscated.27 Is it a lack of talent or an understanding of markets that keeps 
entrepreneurs from appearing? Malfeasance and corruption create uncertainty that 
makes it difficult to build a business larger than a market stall in many parts of the 
world.  
Consider the lack of entrepreneurs in the former Soviet Union where the most 
astonishingly creative people with the most ingenious ideas are unable to match their 
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ideas with finance.  The insurmountable obstacle is that some gangster will grab the 
surplus profits not seized by the government.  This is the threat those fortunate to live in 
Silicon Valley never have to face and it is the invisible, rarely acknowledged debt they 
owe to American social and political institutions that function while asking nothing in 
return.   An investor from Omaha, Nebraska, that purchases stock from a broker in New 
York never worries if he really owns or can be defrauded of his shares.  This is why 
China’s highflying internet companies, NetEase, Sohu, and Sinaq are traded on the 
Nasdaq.28 How did the division of labor occur between the venture capitalist and the 
investing public?   That speculation depends upon an elaborate infrastructure of 
contractual enforcement mechanisms that are embedded in social institutions that 
evolved over generations. 
Innovation must be protected from both private and governmental malfeasance.  It 
requires a reliable set of public goods and services that facilitate contract enforcement at 
reasonable cost.  This protection must include well-defined property rights and 
bankruptcy rules that are clearly specified in law and a judicial system that can reliably 
implement collateral repossession, execute guarantees and deter breach of contracts.  
Most importantly, investments in high value-added activities require high quality 
information about the assets and liabilities of companies.29 Government can be the 
greatest insurance of the integrity of that information or it can be the most important 
source of its contamination, by virtue of the fact that government is often the largest 
creditor and the largest borrower in any economy.  How it discloses its own financial 
management fundamentally influences quality of financial data available to the private 
sector.  
 
INSTITUTIONS AS INCUBATORS 
In conclusion, Silicon Valley provides a simple but compelling message about the 
possibilities of value creation in today’s world. Success in the knowledge age cannot be 
accomplished by the simple transference of technical know how.  The notion that “if we 
build it they will come” is unrealistic.  If it were realistic Silicon Valleys would crop up 
everywhere. Trust, laws, social forces, internal governance structures, financial and 
information-intermediaries, regulators and civil society all make critical 
contributions.30Silicon Valley prides itself on independence from the outside; on its 
reputed ability to pull itself up by its own bootstraps but it depends upon a legacy of 
public institutions that mitigate market risk. 
This leads us to an important conclusion about the role of social institutions in 
development.  It has often been argued that the rule of law is not important in the early 
stages of development when exchanges are usually conducted in the context of 
traditional relationships.  The implication being that only as countries scale up and 
develop professionally managed companies does it become necessary to establish 
impartial rule-making bodies. But this neat dichotomy between stages of development 
does not apply to countries like Brazil, China, or India with high tech ambitions to be 
part of international technology flows.31 In these developing countries that seek to 
become centers of technology-intensive production, the emergence of the underlying 
social institutions will be the greatest challenge for future prosperity.    
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China has done best when it builds factories that use lots of people.  Its labor will 
remain cheap for decades and it needs to generate millions of new jobs to maintain 
social stability.  However to sustain technological development and excel in the long 
term China faces a hurdle most developing societies face. Success requires legal and 
financial infrastructure as much as it requires training and facilities.32 
From the legacy of Silicon Valley, China can learn to appreciate the parts played by the 
individual, investor and inventor, who saw a glimmer of the future and then acted on 
their dreams.    Silicon Valley owes much of its success to individual investors who 
joined individual inventors to make bets on the future based on vision, imagination and 
confidence in the future.  An innovator must trust being able to appropriate the value 
invested in discovery and innovation.  When their dreams failed to materialize, 
government liabilities or public malfeasance was not involved.  The cost of the Internet 
bubble fell on those best able to afford it, leaving the government and the taxpayer out 
of harm’s way.   
When will citizen investors and innovators be invited to play a major role in China’s 
future? Individual innovators in China are still unable to capture the rewards of 
tomorrow’s productivity because they have difficulty gaining access to today’s capital.  
In a world dependant upon government or vested interests for capital, what makes the 
story of Silicon Valley so poignant for China is the prominent role it extends to the 
hopes, dreams, predilections and taste for risk of private investor and innovator alike.  
China, like its developing country counterparts, has no shortage of dreamers who 
imagine a better future.  What they need are the institutional bridges between ideas and 
money to turn their dreams into products demanded by the market.   
Hilton L. Root, Professor of Public Policy, School of Public Policy, George Mason 










International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 






                                                 
1 Warschauer, 2004.To create knowledge using information technology, social inclusion 
and social development are essential 
 
 
2 Wilson III, 2004. Discusses the links between information revolution and social and 
political change in Brazil, China and Ghana.   
3 Mokyr, 2002: 284 - 297. Useful knowledge requires institutions that link technology 
with sources of financing. 
4 China’s technology anxieties run far deeper than those of Western societies, which 
have survived technology bubbles before. China has not been as fortunate. The gap 
between technology and the market is historically China’s Achilles’ heel. Between the 
10th and 14th centuries China was the technology hub of the world, but its cutting edge 
technologies were not put into commercial use and never entered the mainstream of 
people’s lives. 
5In Shanghai alone more than 30,000 returnees are working for start up businesses; 90 
percent with advanced degrees from oversees.  Shanghai authorities expect the number 
to reach 120,000 by 2010 (Kaufman, The Asian Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2003).    
6 On the global mania to create Silicon Valley’s around the world see Koepp, 2002:1-4.  
A website that traces global “siliconia” registers over 100 locations. The Netherlands 
has a Silicon Polder, Taiwan is known as Silicon Island, Bangalore is called the Silicon 
Valley of India.   
7 Economist, January 6th 2005. 
8 For an analytical narrative of Silicon Valley's evolution, see Koepp: 27-128. 
9 Saxenian emphasizes the blurring of individual company boundaries (1994). 
10 IBM decentralized its structure, to make fast decisions based on closeness to 
performance and to accurately assess the cost of outcomes. 
11 Vives: 193. 
12 Richard Florida, Regions that rank high on the gay and bohemian indexes are likely 
promoters of innovation.   
13 Richard Florida, 2002 Chapters 13-17. 
14 World bank, 2003.  
15 Venture backed firms represent 11% of all new jobs but 1% of the capital. 
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16 In 2001, after the dot com explosion, venture capital investments shrank to $31 
billion, this return to more normal levels still represents significant level of funding.  
(National Commission on Entrepreneurship, 2002, page 25).  A major turning point is 
considered to be the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that reduced the number of tax shelter 
schemes for individual investors.  Their disappearance sent individual investment 
dollars seeking other high return options such as venture funds or direct equity 
investments in entrepreneurial companies.  Another milestone in the growth of equity 
capital was regulation in 1978 that taxed stock sales at lower rates than ordinary income 
rates, which changed the mind-set of individual investors who started to seek out 
entrepreneurial companies that offered high returns.  Also critical were changes to 
bankruptcy laws also in 1978 that protected individual creditors, whose business had 
failed from losing house and home, thus removing a stigma of failure.   
17Venture capitalist surveyed by Gorman and Sahlman had replaced an average of three 
CEOs during their careers. (1989)   
18 “We found that in more than half of all venture capital backed companies the CEO 
was removed by the time we observed them (when they were 6.5 years old, on 
average).” Hellman in Chong-Moon Lee ed., 282. 
19 “At the height of the dot-com boom, fully half of all the companies that made an 
initial public offering of their stock were venture backed”; 2002 National Commission 
on Entrepreneurship: 25.   
20For models that treat control issues in venture contracting see Chan, Siegel, and 
Thakor (1990) and Berglof (1992).  
21 Admati and Pfleiderer discuss how venture capital arose to solve a financial 
contracting problem in which several stages in project development exist requiring a 
decision about whether to continue and invest additional capital (1994).  
22 Black and Gilson: 1998: 243-277.  
23 In India the socialized banking system created an excessive demand for funds with 
below the market interest rates but Rafiq Dossani explains "bankers extended the loans 
to their safest customers. These were primarily the large firms owned by the 
government, which operated the largest steel, coal electrical and other manufacturing 
industries.  The other large bank borrowers were the giant family conglomerates such as 
the Tata and Birla group.  This increased the group’s economic power, but did not lead 
to economically efficient decisions about how to deploy capital. Small firms were 
starved for capital. Thus the Indian banks provided no resources for entrepreneurial 
firms" (Dossani and Kenney, 2002:234-35).    
24 Banks will be reluctant to lend to people they do not know when their expectations of 
repayment are not supported by independent judges and good commercial laws. 
25 Most assets have diminishing marginal returns.  For example, as more laborers join 
the labor market, returns to existing laborers decline.  Networks by contrast, do not have 
diminishing returns caused by crowding out.  For example the advantage of owning a 
network increases with each new member in the network.  Once an airline reservation 
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system is developed its usefulness is limited only by the size of the market not by its 
own use.  Strong positive spillovers exist in knowledge networks because new 
knowledge compliments existing knowledge. Use by one party does not crowd out by 
the use of another party as in the case of manual labor.  Knowledge is more valuable the 
more society already knows.  Romer (1994, 1998) elaborates the theory of the nonrival 
or nonscarcity attributes of intangibles such as software. His belief that intangible inputs 
or negligible opportunity costs exist beyond the original investment led him to put his 
own economic textbook on the web.  Once written further investment is not needed to 
ship a book to yet another customer over the web.  
26Richard Ben Cramer: 28 
27In a study across Italian regions Rajan and Zingales report that a more developed 
financial system enables people to become self-employed.  "Even after controlling for 
other regional differences, an individual living in the most financially develop region is 
33 percent more likely to start out on her own than an individual with the same 
characteristics living in the least financially developed regions.  By reducing the 
importance of initial wealth financial development also allows people to start out 
younger on their own." Rajan and Zingales, 2003: 121.   
28 In Egypt, Hernando de Soto (2000) reports, 88% of the businesses are informal 
because it takes at least two years to establish a legal business.  92% of the buildings are 
illegal including those built by the President because of the difficulty in establishing 
property rights.  Egypt has eight different property systems.  Four billion people around 
the world have the potential of owning 3 trillion dollars in real estate if only they could 
establish rights to what they use.   
29 The lessons of the American experience are not lost on these companies that 
emphasize making money and retaining profits.  They hope to eschew the excesses of 
the American model by depending on advertising revenues from old-economy 
mainstays and avoiding dependence on revenue from dotcoms.  They pay software 
engineers a fraction of their U.S. counterparts and they operate with higher profit 
margins.   
30 Many technology firms offer share options to make it easier to obtain and retain 
skilled workers. To be appealing these shares must be portable and the firm must 
maintain high standards of financial transparency to determine the value of shares when 
an employee or manager leaves the firm.   
31 One of the reasons Silicon Valley thrived was an inter-firm social interactions and 
customer network tie that facilitates knowledge acquisition.  These ties also produced 
inter-firm trust, which added to firm performance. China’s weak civic capabilities will 
affect the productivity of its firms and reduce overall productivity. 
32 In a paper that studies how economic development promotes the rule of law Chong-
En Bai et al. argue that the social benefit of establishing a rule of law is greatest at high 
levels of development.  In the early stages of economic growth development occurs 
despite the lack of rule of law.  The conundrum facing the large developing economies 
like India and China is that they seek to develop sectors of the economy like computers 
and software that require significant use of external funds in the first decade of their 
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existence (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). The costs imposed by weak of law will adversely 
impact financial development, which in turn will hinder industrial development in 
sectors dependent on external finance.  Thus these economies find themselves needing 
the rule of law at a time when they do not have the social forces to promote its rapid 
development. (Mcmillan and Woodruff, 1999).  Without an existing modern sector a 
group will not gain adequate political support to overcome the incumbent interests that 
benefit from the lack of rule of law (Chong-En Bai et al., 2002).    
33 Of Asian societies Singapore is well placed to follow the open industry architecture 
of the Silicon-Valley model.  Singapore has relatively strong financial governance, a 
developed financial service sector, a multi-cultural character and a large expat 
community that functions effectively on the basis of weak social ties buttressed by a 
reliable legal system.   
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